Forget Copenhagen by Kunz, Barbara & Röß, Daniela
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The following ad supports maintaining our C.E.E.O.L. service 
 
 
Forget Copenhagen
«Forget Copenhagen»
by Barbara Kunz; Daniela Röß
Source:
Spotlight Europe (Spotlight Europe), issue: 12 / 2009, pages: 1­8, on www.ceeol.com.
 
sp
ot
lig
ht
 e
ur
op
e 
 
# 
20
09
/1
2
spotlight europe 
# 2009/12 – December 2009 
Forget Copenhagen 
 
 
 
Barbara Kunz
Barbara.Kunz@Bertelsmann-Stiftung.de
 
Daniela Röß
Daniela.Roess@Bertelsmann-Stiftung.de
Next week’s Climate Summit in Copenhagen presents the opportunity to 
establish a global response to climate change – an opportunity that most 
likely will be wasted. Yet, although dismal prospects for a follow-up are 
deplorable, failure in Copenhagen must not be the excuse for Europe to be 
inactive. Rather, the motto must be: forget Copenhagen, don’t wait for the 
world – get your act together on your own. 
On 7 – 18 December 2009, the world gath-
ers in Copenhagen in order to negotiate a 
follow-up agreement to the Kyoto Protocol. 
Before the summit’s start, it is already 
considered a failure. Despite the Danish 
Prime Minister Lars Løkke’s insisting that 
Copenhagen “must produce targets”, con-
crete results are unlikely to come out of 
the summit, not least since the Asian-
Pacific leaders recently declared that a 
binding international agreement was out 
of reach. 
 
At the beginning of this year, hopes were 
higher than ever to reach a new and all-
embracing climate deal in Copenhagen. 
Government leaders were ambitious to 
come to an agreement, at least on paper. 
In 2008, the Group of Eight (G8) countries 
stated that they intended to cut emissions 
by 50 % until 2050 (as compared to levels 
of 1990). With the new Obama-
administration the long awaited shift in US 
climate policy had finally arrived. Not long 
ago, the presidents of the United States 
and China, Barack Obama and Hu Jintao, 
declared that they wanted a “comprehen-
sive agreement” and would work towards 
“a successful outcome” in Copenhagen. 
“We must harness the necessary political 
will to seal the deal on an ambitious new 
climate agreement in December here in 
Copenhagen” was emphatically stated by 
UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon earlier 
this year. 
 
At the European level, the EU committed 
in 2008 to cut its emissions to at least  
20 % below 1990 levels by 2020. Brussels 
is still pushing for a global agreement to 
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be reached in Copenhagen, emphasising 
the urgency of measures implemented 
world wide in order to mitigate climate 
change and adapt to its consequences. Ac-
cordingly, the European Environment 
Agency labelled Copenhagen Conference 
the “most important climate meeting 
I 
What is  
“Copenhagen” exactly? 
“Copenhagen” is intend  
a
ted Nations Framework Conven-
on on Climate Change entered into 
ed to bring forward
 new agreement on greenhouse gas emis-
sion cuts, succeeding the Kyoto Protocol. 
The December 2009 meeting in Copen-
hagen is simultaneously the 15th Confer-
ence of the Parties to the UNFCCC – the 
United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change – and the 5th Meet-
ing of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol. 
In UN speak, Copenhagen is thus termed 
“COP 15/MOP 5”.  The UNFCCC is an in-
ternational, multilateral environmental 
treaty, a child of the United Nations Con-
ference on Environment and Develop-
ment (UNCED) held in Rio de Janeiro in 
1992. Conventions are general treaties 
among states, while protocols usually 
contain much more detailed provisions 
on how the Convention’s goals are to be 
achieved. In the case of the UNFCCC and 
Kyoto, the objective consists in the “sta-
bilization of greenhouse gas concentra-
tion in the atmosphere at a level that 
would prevent dangerous anthropogenic 
interference with the climate system”. To 
that end, Kyoto contains targets for re-
ducing greenhouse gas emissions that 
apply to its signatory states. 
 
The Uni
ti
force in 1994. The Kyoto Protocol, in 
turn, was adopted in 1997 at the third 
Climate Change Conference in Kyoto and 
entered into force in 2005. The Protocol 
for the first time sets internationally 
binding emission reduction targets and 
links them to a clear time frame, termed 
“commitment period”. The first commit-
ment period of the Kyoto Protocol does 
however end on 31 December 2012. At 
the 2007 Bali conference, the interna-
tional community therefore adopted the 
Bali roadmap in which it agreed to take 
up negotiations on a comprehensive cli-
mate protection agreement to ensure that 
Access via CEEOL NL Germany
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additional efforts will be undertaken once 
this first commitment period end. A con-
clusion of these negotiations is to be 
reached at the December 2009 climate 
conference in Copenhagen, so that the 
agreement can enter into force in 2013, 
immediately after the first commitment 
period under the Kyoto Protocol expires. 
 
II 
Climate Change: 
W  
In rec tific 
debate and 
 
cientists predict a rise in temperature of 
son for careful opti-
ism. Most experts agree that changes in 
hat Scientists Say
ent years, progress in the scien
research has been made: for 
the vast majority of scientists, climate 
change is today considered a fact. From 
being a concern for an unlikely conglom-
erate of do-gooders and cultural pessi-
mists, climate change today occupies top 
positions on high-level agendas. This una-
nimity is nonetheless an achievement of 
the 2006 Stern Report and the work of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC), sharing the 2007 Nobel 
Peace Price with Al Gore. In its most no-
ticed Fourth Assessment Report of 2007, 
the IPCC concludes that “[w]arming of the 
climate system is unequivocal, as is now 
evident from observations of increases in 
global average air and ocean temperatures, 
widespread melting of snow and ice and 
rising global average sea level.” Climate 
change not only concerns increases in 
temperature: rising sea levels or changed 
patterns of rainfall also have conse-
quences beyond ecosystems, as they po-
tentially affect the daily lives of millions.  
 
Scenarios for the future are rather gloomy.
S
6,4 degrees Celsius by the year 2100, a 
development with wide-ranging conse-
quences on water, ecosystems, food, coasts 
and health – in short, for humankind as a 
whole. At the time being, however, efforts 
made to respond to climate change are 
deemed insufficient by the experts. Not 
even a continuation of Kyoto would be suf-
ficient to curb climate change. As the IPCC 
states in its latest report, “with current 
climate change mitigation policies and re-
lated sustainable development practices, 
global greenhouse gas emissions will con-
tinue to grow over the next few decades.” 
Yet, time is short and action is urgent: 
measures taken now may give results only 
after several decades. 
 
There is, however, rea
m
life-styles and behaviour can be highly ef-
ficient in curbing climate change. Also, the 
Panel underlines the potential that lies 
with new, “cleaner” technologies. In sum, 
while climate change will not be stopped 
and its consequences already are consid-
erable, whether humankind actively en-
gages in adequate responses or not is to a 
very large extent a matter of political will 
– or absence thereof. 
 
III 
A Look Back at Kyoto 
Kyo na-
tiona
 glance, this may sound like a his-
ric success. For the first time, a protocol 
to represents a milestone in inter
l climate policy by, for the first time 
ever, setting internationally binding emis-
sion reductions targets for greenhouse 
gases with a clear time frame. According 
to the Protocol, industrialised states are to 
reduce their collective greenhouse gas 
emissions by a total of 5,2 % below 1990 
levels in the years 2008 to 2012. One 
hundred and eighty four states have rati-
fied the protocol, including all EU member 
states, Russia as well as many large newly 
industrialised countries such as China, In-
dia, Brazil, Mexico, South Africa and South 
Korea. 
 
At first
to
bound wealthy nations to cut their emis-
sions and led both industrialised and de-
veloping countries to adopt otherwise 
highly unlikely programmes aimed to ad-
dress the problem of global warming. Cre-
ating awareness and educating the publics 
about the risks of climate change world-
wide was another of its achievements. Yet 
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most importantly, Kyoto to date remains 
the only viable, legally binding agreement 
for confronting the causes of global warm-
ing. Being the only one of its kind, the Pro-
tocol by definition is a success. 
 
In other re-
s
ever, Kyoto 
must be con-
sidered a fail-
ure. The 
United States 
as the 
world’s larg-
est emitter of 
greenhouse 
gases – at 
least at tha
time – re-
fused to rat-
ify the proto-
col, which 
significantly 
weakened the 
agreement. G
influential 
cation would impede economic growth, 
given that the major share of emissions 
results from burning of fossil fuel for en-
ergy, transportation, deforestation and the 
agricultural sector. Former President Bush 
officially motivated his rejection of Kyoto 
by the fact that developing countries were 
exempted from emission reduction obliga-
tions, a point he was not alone to raise. 
The failure to include developing countries 
“with shared but differentiated responsi-
bility” in legal obligations with clear re-
duction targets has indeed been widely 
criticised.  
 
But the U.S. refusal to ratify
vernment leaders as well as 
w
considered a disappointment. Because of 
the negotiating states’ inability to estimate 
the degree of global warming and the costs 
of addressing the damage, stringent emis-
sion targets have been diluted in subse-
quent negotiations. Environmental lobby 
groups and non-governmental organisa-
tions claimed that emission targets were 
far too low and stipulated more adequate 
targets to meet the challenge of worldwide 
climate change. Furthermore, it is quite 
unlikely that all ratifying states will fulfil 
their commitments for the years 2008 to 
ance mechanisms, ensuring adherence and 
enforcement. 
 
IV 
Spectacular results 
By now, it h t spectacu-
lar results w  of Copen-
are unlikely 
as become clear tha
ill hardly come out
hagen. Time is running out as world lead-
ers’ commitment to firm agreements is 
fading away. At the APEC summit in mid-
November, the U.S. Deputy National Secu-
rity Advisor reported that “[t]here was an 
assessment by the leaders that it was un-
realistic to expect a full internationally le-
gally binding agreement to be negotiated 
between now and when Copenhagen 
starts”, thereby only summarising devel-
opments apparent on the horizon for many 
months.  
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T
change more generally – to a very large 
extent is a debate on burden sharing. Who 
contributes how much is at the centre of 
attention. One illustration is the discus-
sion pertaining to the year to be defined as 
the basis for emission cuts. Depending on 
which year is chosen as the reference, a 
20 % reduction of emissions is more or 
less difficult to achieve. From a European 
perspective, for instance, 1990 is a lot 
more advantageous than 2005 (favoured 
e.g. by Japan): due to the heavy industry in 
the Eastern Bloc throughout socialist 
times, emissions in Europe were high dur-
ing the early 1990s but diminished “auto-
matically” in the years after 1989 and 
these industries disappeared. Starting 
from 2005 would, in turn, require much 
greater efforts. The easiest option for 
Europe therefore consists in taking 1990 
as the reference. 
 
M
emitters of greenhouse gases like China 
(surpassing the U.S. since 2008) and India 
have other priorities than mitigating cli-
mate change. Among these preoccupations 
first and foremost is economic growth, an 
objective (rightly or wrongly) considered 
to be incompatible with effective measures 
against climate change. With growth 
comes competitiveness, an indispensable 
feature in world economy. Although tack-
ling climate change and its consequences 
certainly is in the long-term interest of 
mankind as a whole, taking to concrete 
measures in the short and medium term 
may thus, unfortunately, be against many 
countries’ (not necessarily illegitimate) in-
terest.  
 
T
is the perfect example of the prisoner’s di-
lemma impeding cooperation: unless eve-
rybody cooperates, individual actors are 
better off looking after themselves. For in-
stance, different levels of commitment re-
sulting in varying prices put on carbon 
emissions (from none at all to European 
prices) distort markets and have a nega-
tive impact on industries located in the 
“greener” parts of the world. Overcoming 
that dilemma is the momentous challenge 
lying ahead. Dismal prospects for Copen-
hagen are therefore hardly surprising. As 
history bears out, genuine cooperation 
among sovereign nation states is unlikely 
to occur in all realms of policy; observable 
examples to the contrary are exceptions 
rather than the rule. Trade, development, 
security and disarmament: in all these 
fields, national interests (perhaps aggre-
gated at regional levels) are the primary 
driving forces in actors’ behaviour. There 
is no reason to expect that things should 
be different when it comes to environ-
mental questions. Belief in global solu-
tions to climate change is a noble attitude, 
but – alas – an unrealistic one as the his-
tory of global (environmental) governance 
rather unequivocally illustrates.  
 
In
dents of China and the United States –, 
Copenhagen no longer is the endpoint of 
negotiations it initially was meant to be, 
but rather yet another climate summit. As 
a consequence, coming to terms with new 
provisions on emission cuts no longer has 
any given ending point and could theoreti-
cally go on forever. By devaluating Copen-
hagen in such a way, the world loses a 
deadline for climate negotiations. In light 
of the urgency with which action is re-
quired, this development is nothing but 
tragic and illustrates that governments 
around the world have failed to under-
stand the magnitude of the challenge 
posed. 
 
V 
Don’t Wait For 
The odds for a successful climate summit 
Copenhagen 
are low. Yet, as deplorable as failure in 
Copenhagen may be, it does not leave 
Europe bereft of options for action. Al-
though Europe can do little about emis-
sions elsewhere in the world, the EU can 
continue doing its homework. Waiting for 
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global agreements is the wrong approach 
anyway, though certainly a comfortable 
one.  
 
T
agreement for national governments and 
the EU to get active and step up its efforts. 
National states as well as 
Brussels continue to hold 
powerful instruments in 
their hands when it comes 
to creating incentives for 
mitigation and establish-
ing systems aimed to re-
duce emissions. Research 
and development espe-
cially is to play an impor-
tant role within that con-
text. Experts emphasise 
technology as a hugely 
important part of the solu-
tion, if not the solution. All 
stabilisation levels consid-
ered necessary can be 
achieved by technologies, 
either already on the mar-
ket or expected to be 
launched in the decades to 
come. Supporting the de-
velopment of these tech-
nologies is a key task for 
policy makers. National 
governments as well as 
Brussels must prioritise 
this agenda and implement 
according policies. As the 
world will increasingly 
demand “green” technol-
ogy, investing in its devel-
opment in time is the ob-
vious path to choose. 
Moreover, investing in 
green infrastructure in de-
veloping countries is one 
way of coupling economic 
and sustainable develop-
ment, to the benefit of all 
interested parts. For the 
EU, this means that even m
should be put on the promotion of re-
search, development and the distribution 
of green technologies. 
In order to do so, natio
ore emphasis 
the European Union have an impressive 
array of policy tools at their disposal, re-
gardless of whether Copenhagen results in 
a binding agreement or not. The IPCC es-
timated that mitigating climate change 
would result in an annual average GDP 
2000 to 2100. Estimations of the cost of 
climate change range from 5 to up to 20 % 
of global GDP by 2100. Regardless of the 
costs such a focus on research and devel-
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opment engenders, it is more than clear 
that investing now will always be cheaper 
than doing nothing and waiting for the 
long-term consequences of climate change 
to become manifest.  
 
It
get a sense that things went wrong in the 
past, also in Europe. Europeans would be 
well advised to overcome their wide-
spread complacency, considering them-
selves as the champions of climate protec-
tion and sustainability. Launching the 
European Climate Change Programme was 
a good idea. The EU Emission Trading Sys-
tem is a step into the right direction, like-
wise the Climate Package concluded in 
late 2008. Yet, while European efforts may 
go farther than others’, there clearly is 
room for improvement. Negotiations of the 
2008 Climate Package, for instance, be-
came just yet another exercise in Euro-
pean horse-trading and bickering. Euro-
pean national interests clearly don’t con-
verge into one common and self-evident 
climate protection agenda. Consequently, 
true commitment to ecofriendly action and 
sustainability does obviously not always 
characterise political acting on this conti-
nent, as for instance responses to the on-
going economic crisis so vividly illustrate. 
Against that background, it is all the more 
important that the EU stands firm on its 
agreed-upon positions for Copenhagen and 
beyond. If Europe fails to corroborate its 
action with deeds, the perspectives for a 
global response look dimmer than ever. 
Put bluntly: if the European Union doesn’t 
get its act together, then who will? 
 
R
ronmental sustainability is a difficult task. 
One important factor in that equation is 
the transatlantic link. Europe must take 
advantage of the window of opportunity 
opened by the Obama administration’s 
willingness to take climate change seri-
ously. As Kyoto so vividly illustrated, a re-
sponse to climate change will simply not 
happen without Washington. The United 
States and Europe share many of the prob-
lems – not least negative consequences on 
competitiveness – arising from carbon 
taxes or cap-and-trade systems. In an ideal 
world, this would offer common ground 
and a basis of cooperation, rather than a 
rat-race between the two economies. By 
planning to come to Copenhagen in per-
son, Obama is doing more than simply 
demonstrating his good will. Europe 
should take him seriously. 
 
F
over Copenhagen and the debate on emis-
sion cuts: Even if the world manages to 
mitigate climate change in the future by 
cutting greenhouse gas emissions, many of 
its effects are already irreversible. In addi-
tion to stopping and – hopefully – revers-
ing ongoing evolutions, one of the central 
questions therefore is that of adaptation to 
new climatic circumstances. As a matter of 
fact, it is the poorer part of the world that 
is most dramatically hit by climate change 
and its consequences, ranging from rising 
sea levels to droughts and increasingly se-
vere weather conditions. Even if the G8 
countries came to zero emissions, its self-
imposed objectives of cutting emissions by 
50 % until 2050 could not be achieved as 
long as all other countries keep their lev-
els steady (not to mention increase them). 
Not only mitigating climate change is a 
matter on the agenda. Helping the worlds’ 
most affected countries adapt to the ir-
revocable damages is at least equally ur-
gent. 
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